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We are living through an era of increased robotisation. Some authors have already begun to 
explore the impact of this robotisation on legal rules and practice. In doing so, many highlight 
potential liability gaps that might arise through robot misbehaviour. Although these gaps are 
interesting and socially significant, they do not exhaust the possible gaps that might be created 
by increased robotisation. In this article, I make the case for one of those alternative gaps: the 
retribution gap. This gap arises from a mismatch between the human desire for retribution and 
the absence of appropriate subjects of retributive blame. I argue for the potential existence of this 
gap in an era of increased robotisation; suggest that it is much harder to plug this gap than it is to 
plug those thus far explored in the literature; and then highlight three important social 
implications of this gap. 
Abstract 
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 1. Introduction 
 We are living through an era of increasing robotisation. Robots are fighting our 
wars, manufacturing our goods, stacking our warehouses, and caring for our most 
vulnerable citizens. Soon they will be driving our cars, delivering our goods, cooking 
our meals, and generally taking over large swathes of human activity (Ford 2015; 
Kaplan 2015). Technological changes of this sort have profound social, moral and legal 
implications. This article takes a narrow look at the potential impact of advanced 
roboticisation on our attitudes toward punishment and wrongdoing. 
 
 This is not a new area of inquiry. Legal theorists and philosophers have long 
thought about the potential impacts of robots on law and morality. Many have identified 
gaps in the existing legal-regulatory infrastructure that are challenged by the rise of the 
robots (Calo, Kerr and Froomkin 2016). But most of these identified gaps focus on 
liability issues that arise from robot misdeeds (i.e. who should be liable if a robot 
injures or harms another human being?) (Matthias 2004; Calo 2015), or more fancifully 
on the philosophical question of whether a robot could be morally and legally 
responsible (Matthias 2004; Purves et al 2015). What these pre-existing inquiries have 
missed is the potential ‘retribution gap’ that could arise from the widespread use of 
robots. In this article, I try to clarify and make the case for this gap. 
 
 My argument is simple. Psychological evidence suggests that humans are innate 
retributivists (Carlsmith and Darley 2008; Jenson 2010): when they are harmed or 
injured they look for a culpable wrongdoer who is deserving of punishment. Many legal 
and moral philosophers argue that this retributive attitude is the correct one to take 
(Alexander and Ferzan 2009; Moore 1993; Duff 2007). Increasing levels of robotisation 
make it likely that robots will be responsible for more and more harm and injury, but 
the robots themselves are unlikely to meet the conditions for retributive blame. 
Consequently a retribution gap is opened up: people will be eager to find an appropriate 
and deserving subject of retributive punishment, but none will be found. This gap could 
have a number of significant social and legal implications.  
 
 The article defends this argument in four parts. First, I clarify the conceptual 
terrain and distinguish more clearly between ‘liability gaps’ and ‘retribution gaps’. 
Second, I introduce and defend the argument for thinking that increased robotisation 
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will give rise to a retribution gap. Third, I reply to objections to this argument. Fourth, 
and finally, I consider three important social implications of the retribution gap. 
 
 2. Defining Robots and the Retribution Gap 
 The argument in this article has to do with the nature of robots, the phenomenon 
of robotisation (i.e. the increasing use of robots), and the impact of both on social 
practices of responsibility and blame. It is important to start by clarifying the conceptual 
terrain associated with these phenomena. Doing so allows me to situate the argument I 
defend relative to somewhat similar arguments.  
 
 I start by clarifying that my argument is concerned with robots that have a high 
degree of autonomy. What it means for a robot to be autonomous is a matter of some 
debate in the literature on robot ethics (e.g. Sparrow 2007, 64-66). Here I adopt the 
approach of Hellstrom (2013). He argues that we can distinguish between robots based 
on their ‘autonomous power’. He defines this as a gradient-concept which denotes “the 
amount and level of actions, interactions and decisions an agent is capable of 
performing on its own” (Hellstrom 2013, 101). In other words, it denotes the ability of 
the robot to act in the world without input or control from a human designer, 
programmer or operator. Hellstrom intends for the concept to have a broad potential 
application, but for degrees of autonomous power to be discernible. The more actions 
and the more diverse the range of environments in which they can be deployed without 
human interference or control, the more autonomous the robot is. So, for example, 
Hellstrom argues that a landmine has a very low degree of autonomous power: it is 
capable of performing one ‘action’ (detonation) in a range of environments, in response 
to pressure/mass on its triggering mechanism, without the need for human control. A 
self-driving car would have a much higher degree of autonomous power: it would be 
able to act in various ways (breaking, turning, accelerating etc), across a range of 
environments, without the need for human interference or control. Contrariwise, certain 
objects that we often deem to be robotic can have no autonomous power whatsoever. 
Teleoperated military drones are like this because they rely on human input and 
oversight to exert their causal powers.  
 
 The stipulation that robots have a high degree of autonomous power is relevant to 
my argument because it is that power that threatens to break the link between the human 
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creators and designers of such systems and their ultimate causal effects. If robots were 
little more than tools — as teleoperated systems effectively are — then there would be 
no risk of a ‘liability’ or ‘retribution’ gap opening up in the law. The human controllers 
would be liable and subject to retributive blame. The fact that robots are being created 
with relatively high degrees of autonomous power does threaten to open up such gaps. 
 
 This brings us to the second key conceptual clarification: the distinction between a 
liability-gap and a retribution-gap. This is a distinction that has been neglected in the 
literature to date and is central to the argument I present in this article. In distinguishing 
between these two concepts it is worth keeping in mind a set of background concepts. 
These concepts all centre around the notion of moral and legal responsibility. 
‘Responsibility’ is a bundle-concept and the term can be used in a number of distinct 
ways. In saying this, I follow the lead of HLA Hart (1968) and, more recently, Nicole 
Vincent (2011). ‘Responsibility’ is a term used to denote the relationship between an 
agent, its actions, and the outcomes of those actions. There are several such 
relationships that are relevant from a legal and moral perspective.1 Three of those 
relationships are important to the present argument. The first is that of causal 
responsibility, which denotes a causal link between the agent, their actions, and some 
particular outcome. The second is that of moral/legal responsibility, which denotes the 
fact that the causal link between the agent and the action/outcome is such that the agent 
is an appropriate subject of legal/moral blame.2 This is usually determined by whether 
the agent has the right capacities and whether those capacities were exercised at the 
relevant time. The third is liability responsibility, which denotes the punishments or 
sanctions that an agent must bear in virtue of its moral/legal responsibility. The concept 
of liability responsibility can be further distinguished depending on the relevant area of 
moral/legal practice. Thus, in legal practice, distinctions can be drawn between 
compensatory-liability (which applies primarily in civil/tort law and sometimes in 
criminal law) and is about paying back the victims of harm or injury; and punitive-
liability (which applies primarily in criminal law) and is about suffering harm and 
public condemnation for wrongs done. This means that there are several sub-types of 
liability gap and the retribution gap is one such sub-type – one that is not associated 
with compensation or burden-sharing. 
                                                           
1 Vincent (2011) argues that there are at least six: virtue-responsibility; role-responsibility; outcome-
responsibility; causal-responsibility; capacity-responsibility; and liability-responsibility. 
2 The concepts of legal and moral responsibility can be distinguished and sometimes pull apart. However 
that possibility can be ignored here. 
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 In the case of human agents, causal-, moral/legal- and liability- responsibility tend 
to come together. If I drive a car whilst drunk, and if in doing this I collide with and 
injure a pedestrian, then I am causally responsible for the injury, I am legally and 
morally blameworthy for causing the injury, and I am forced to pay compensation and 
serve time in jail. The problem with the rise of robotisation is that these links can break 
down. A robotic agent, with the right degree of autonomous power, will tend to be 
causally responsible for certain injurious or harmful actions. However, the robot will 
not be morally and legally responsible (because it will lack the requisite moral 
capacities), nor will the human creators and designers be morally/legally responsible 
because the robot has a sufficient level of independence from them. The end result is a 
liability gap: there is no suitable agent who can bear the burden associated with the 
injurious outcome. But the precise nature of the gap can vary depending on particular 
legal practice. Thus, in the civil law context the gap will tend to be compensatory in 
nature, whereas in the criminal context it will be retributive in nature. 
 
 This might seem a little sketchy. How exactly do the gaps arise? The answer is 
that the gaps arise when the moral/legal tests for determining who should bear the 
burden fail to align with the reality of who is causing the injurious outcome. This 
argument has been specifically traced out by several writers in relation to the 
compensatory gap that could arise from the use of robots. Calo’s recent discussion is 
instructive (2015, 129-131). As Calo points out, civil law tests for liability typically 
require a plaintiff (i.e. victim of injury) to prove that (i) the defendant owed them a duty 
of care and (ii) that the defendant breached a standard of care. It may be relatively easy 
to argue that a robot manufacturer or designer owes a customer or third party a duty of 
care. Indeed, some of the most famous cases in legal history make the existence of such 
a duty clear.3 The difficulty arises with the standard of care. Many legal tests insist that 
the injury suffered by the plaintiff be reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. The 
problem is that robots are increasingly programmed with machine learning algorithms 
that lead them engage in acts that are not anticipated, expected or reasonably 
foreseeable by the original manufacturer. The traditional legal standard cannot be 
stretched to cover the kinds of scenario made possible by advanced autonomous robots. 
                                                           
3 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 - Is a foundational decision in English tort law holding that you 
owe a duty of care to your ‘neighbour’, where neighbour is defined relatively broadly. In that particular 
case, it included the consumer of a product who was not its actual purchaser. 
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The result is a liability gap: there is an injurious outcome but no legally identifiable 
compensation-giver. 
 
 Compensation gaps of this sort are interesting and worthy of consideration. 
Nevertheless, there are alternative civil legal standards that can be used to plug those 
gaps. For example, a combination of vicarious liability rules and strict liability rules 
could do the trick.4 These would allow one person to be responsible for the actions of 
another and do away with the need to prove reasonable foreseeability. Indeed, Calo 
himself suggests that increased robotisation could give rise to increased use of strict 
liability standards (2015, 40; Scherer 2016 makes a similar point about AI). 
Alternatively, there could be greater use of social insurance funds to pay out 
compensation to victims of robotic harm. So although this is something worth worrying 
about, there are plausible ways to solve the problem and ensure that people receive the 
necessary compensation. 
 
 What I want to argue in the remainder of this article is that increased robotisation 
can also give rise to important gaps in criminal liability, specifically gaps associated 
with the attribution of retributive blame for wrongdoing. Retributivism is a theory of 
punishment which holds that people should be punished (i.e. suffer some harm or 
setback to interests) for wrongdoing because they deserve to be punished. Embedded in 
this is the notion that their desert is a function of their moral culpability for their actions 
(Moore 1993). The retributive gap arises when people look for culpable wrongdoers to 
blame for some injurious outcome but none can be found. This gap has been neglected 
in the existing literature on robots and the law, and is much less easy to plug.  
 
 It is important to justify this claim by separating the argument I am about to 
present from other similar arguments. Matthias (2004) for instance argues at length in 
favour ‘responsibility’ gaps that arise from the growth of machine learning automata. 
And he makes a strong case for thinking that such automata will not be appropriate 
bearers of responsibility, but in doing so he doesn’t distinguish between the differential 
significance of liability responsibility in different legal contexts. His comments suggest 
a concern with who will pay for the wrongdoing of robots, not so much with who 
deserves retributive blame. Highlighting the importance of this distinction is part of the 
                                                           
4 There are also liability standards associated with control and care for animals that might be adopted by 
analogy. 
  7 
present goal. Sparrow (2007) comes closer to the argument I wish to defend by looking 
at responsibility gaps in the deployment of autonomous weapons systems. He argues 
that the principles of just war require that there be a morally responsible agent making 
lethal decisions about legitimate targets, and that highly autonomous weapons systems 
undermine this requirement. Sparrow’s argument has given rise to a rich debate about 
whether the use of autonomous weapons systems really does breach the conditions of 
just war (e.g. Purves et al 2015; Simpson and Muller 2016), but the argument differs 
from the one I present in three important respects. First, I am not concerned with 
military cases nor with the principles of just war; I am concerned with more mundane 
and everyday uses of autonomous robots. Second, the argument I make is not primarily 
an ethical one. I am not objecting to the use of autonomous robots, nor do I think their 
development is a bad thing. Instead, I am arguing for a mismatch between certain 
psychological desires for punishment and normative theories of punishment. Third, my 
goal is to consider the broader social and legal consequences of this mismatch, not to 
claim (as both Matthias and Sparrow do) that this is a gap that urgently needs to be 
filled. That said, the argument I defend uses some similar concepts and ideas – I will 
identify these in the following section and further highlight the differences. 
 
 3. The Argument for the Retribution Gap 
 My argument for the retribution gap works like this: 
 
(1) If an agent is causally responsible for a morally harmful outcome, people will 
look to attach retributive blame to that agent (or to some other agent who is 
deemed to have responsibility for that agent) — what’s more: many moral and 
legal philosophers believe that this is the right thing to do.  
 
(2) Increased robotisation means that robot agents are likely to be causally 
responsible for more and more morally harmful outcomes. 
 
(3) Therefore, increased robotisation means that people will look to attach 
retributive blame to robots (or other associated agents who are thought to have 
responsibility for those robots, e.g. manufacturers/programmers) for causing those 
morally harmful outcomes. 
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(4) But neither the robots nor the associated agents (manufacturers/programmers) 
will be appropriate subjects of retributive blame for those outcomes. 
 
(5) If there are no appropriate subjects of retributive blame, and yet people are 
looking to find such subjects, then there will be a retribution gap. 
 
(6) Therefore, increased roboticisation will give rise to a retribution gap. 
 
This argument is structurally straightforward. It chains together two sub-arguments. The 
first sub-argument is about the desire for retributive blame and how it may look toward 
robotic agents; the second sub-argument is about how that desire will go unfulfilled. In 
what follows, I offer an initial clarification and defence of the premises. I consider a 
range of objections along the way, but defer two objections to the next section of the 
article.  
 
 Let’s start by looking at premise (1). The crucial concept in this premise is that of 
retributive blame. Here, I adopt a standard account of retribution and retributive blame 
(Moore 1993; Boonin 2008; Zimmerman 2011; Kramer 2011). I view retributivism as 
the belief that agents should be punished, in proportion to their level of wrongdoing, 
because they deserve to be punished. I view retributive blame as being appropriate 
when the agent is morally culpable for the harm that occurred. Culpability is a function 
of a number of standard legal and moral tests. Most typically, an agent is culpable for 
criminal wrongdoing if they deliberately intended some moral harm; or were recklessly 
indifferent or grossly negligent with respect to that moral harm (Moore 1997). I take it 
that lesser standards of culpability (e.g. mere negligence as opposed to gross 
negligence) would not be suitable for retributive blame. I accept that one agent could 
attract retributive blame for the actions of another agent if they have sufficient control 
and/or influence over that agent’s choices. 
 
 This should be relatively uncontroversial. The more problematic aspect of premise 
(1) concerns its awkward dance between descriptivity and normativity. This awkward 
dance is critical to the argument and will continue for the remainder of the article. On 
the one hand, the premise appeals to the notion that there are powerful psychological 
drives pushing people to locate appropriate subjects of retributive blame. This is a 
descriptive/predictive claim. On the other hand, the premise appeals to the notion that 
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some moral and legal philosophers think this is the right thing to do. This is not a 
normative claim per se but it is an implicit appeal to the fact that many theorists think 
the retributive attitude has strong normative grounding and so should provide the 
underpinning for our criminal justice system.5 The combination of this normative stance 
with the general social desire for retribution is what makes the retribution gap worthy of 
our attention (or so I shall argue). As I will argue, it is the potential mismatch between 
the general desire for retribution and the specific requirements of retributive moral 
theory that makes the retribution gap particularly disturbing. To make this point I need 
to first defend the claim that there is a general social desire to engage in retributive 
punishment. 
 
 Three pieces of evidence support that claim. The first is the human tendency to 
attribute events to acts of agency, even when they are not actually acts of agency. 
Humans appear to have hyperactive agency detection devices (HADDs) in their brains 
(Barrett 2004; Boyer 2002; and Atran 2002). Barrett (2004) argues that the HADD 
kicks-in whenever non-inertial movement is detected in our surrounding environments. 
This has sometimes been cited as a major explanation for religious beliefs (particularly 
traditional pagan/animist beliefs), and there are a number of explanations for why 
humans would have a tendency to interpret events as the products of agency. This 
tendency is not essential to the argument I am making, but it is supportive insofar as it 
suggests that humans will be inclined to view the harmful outcomes of robotic action as 
being a product of agency. This tendency opens the door to the attribution of 
punishment and blame. 
 
 The second bit of evidence has to do with the human proclivity to punish. 
Ethnographic evidence suggests that practices of punishment and blame are common to 
all human societies (Jensen 2010; Brown 1991). What’s more, experiments reveal that 
humans have a strong tendency to punish anyone they believe to be violating group 
norms. Indeed, experiments reveal that they will do this even when it is costly to 
themselves (Gintis 2011, Ch 3.6). This proclivity for punishment is further underscored 
by neurobiological evidence suggesting that punishment activates parts of the brain’s 
reward circuit and so is likely to feel pleasurable (Jensen 2010; Pinker 2011, 529-532). 
                                                           
5 There are many criminal theorists who support this basic position: Michael Moore (1993; 1997); Larry 
Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan (2006); and Antony Duff (2007). These theorists support the view on 
moral/philosophical grounds and could be classified as pure retributivists; others support it in part 
because it is the dominant social/psychological attitude, e.g. Robinson and Kurzban (2007). 
  10 
There are a variety of explanations for the tendency to punish, but they are not relevant 
here. All that matters is that there is this tendency to punish when social norms have 
been violated. 
 
 The third piece of evidence is the fact that when people punish they tend to do so 
in accordance with the criteria of retributivism and not the criteria of alternative theories 
of punishment like deterrence or rehabilitation. Support for this comes from 
experimental work and from the evolutionary and ethnographic record (Carlsmith and 
Darley 2008; Jensen 2010). The experimental work is particularly instructive. Through 
a series of studies, Carlsmith and Darley (2008) have revealed six important lines of 
evidence supporting the claim that people are ‘natural’ or ‘innate’ retributivists. That is 
to say, they are inclined to punish people in a manner that is (a) proportionate to their 
level of wrongdoing and (b) sensitive to their degree of blameworthiness. The six lines 
of evidence include the fact that people seem to be more sensitive to retributive criteria, 
more attracted to bits of evidence that are relevant to retributive modes of punishment, 
better able to understand retributive theories of punishment, and are unlikely to support 
an alternative system of punishment (e.g. restorative justice) that does not include 
retributive criteria. In addition to this, it is found that there is often a gap between self-
reported attitudes to punishment and actual behaviour (i.e. people might claim to favour 
deterrence but in practice favour retribution) and even within diverse experimental 
populations it is rare to find people with a consistently non-retributive approach to 
punishment. Collectively, these lines of evidence provide strong support for the claim 
that people are inclined to punish in accordance with retributive criteria. 
 
 Let’s turn attention to premise (2). This premise claims that increasing 
robotisation will lead to increasing levels of harm being caused by robot agents. This 
seems like an obvious truth: if robots participate in more and more activities, and if they 
have more and more autonomous power, then it is likely that they will (at least on 
occasion) be causally responsible for moral harm. A self-driving car, or an autopilot 
mechanism, or even a robot waiter that miscalculates at an inopportune moment could 
cause injury or death. Indeed, there are examples of this already happening. In July 
2015, the Financial Times reported that a German worker had been killed by a robot in 
a car manufacturing plant (Bryant 2015). Some people referred to this as the first act of 
robot homicide. Whatever the merits of that attribution, incidents of this sort can be 
expected to multiply in line with the increase in robotisation. 
  11 
 
 Someone might object to this line of reasoning on the grounds that robots could be 
morally perfect and hence highly unlikely to be causally responsible for moral harm. 
Indeed, safety and reduced risk is often one of the major rationales behind robotisation. 
Google for instance have explicitly argued that their self-driving car should come 
without a steering wheel because it is when humans interfere with the robot that 
accidents are most likely to occur (Walker 2016). But this objection seems naive for at 
least three reasons. First, even if robots are less likely than humans cause harm they are 
unlikely to be perfect. Even if the probability of robot-caused harm is minimal this 
would still translate into an increased amount of causal responsibility for moral harm if 
robots participate in more and more activities. Second, it is naive to assume that the 
creation of even morally excellent robots (let alone morally perfect robots) is easy or 
straightforward. It is very difficult to program or train a robot to follow the kinds of 
moral rules we would like. The difficulty of this task is one of the things that has 
spurred the recent debate about AI risk, and the doomsaying pronouncements of tech 
gurus like Elon Musk and Bill Gates (Sainato 2015). There are several reasons why it is 
so difficult to get robots to engage in appropriate moral behaviour. One is that we don’t 
agree ourselves on what appropriate moral behaviour is in all contexts; another is that 
most moral rules admit of counterexamples or exceptions, particularly if followed 
literally or in unexpected ways, as may be likely in the case of robots — it is probably 
impossible to foresee and avoid all those exceptions; and another is that trying to train 
robots to learn moral rules, through some machine learning algorithm, will often 
generate unexpected results as the robot extrapolates a rule from an unappreciated 
feature of the environment (Muehlhauser and Helm 2013). These and other problems 
are widely discussed in the literature and seem to add support for premise (2) (Matthias 
2011). Third, there may be no incentive to create a morally perfect robot. In fact, some 
robots may be created in order to engage in morally circumspect behaviours, or could 
have powers and abilities that render their behaviour immoral in certain contexts. 
 
 If premises (1) and (2) are accepted, then premise (3) would follow and we reach 
the interim conclusion that in a world of increased robotisation people are likely to look 
to robots (or associated agents like manufacturers and programmers) as potential 
subjects of retributive blame. This brings us to premise (4). This one claims that neither 
robots nor associated agents like manufacturers or programmers will be appropriate 
subjects of retributive blame. It is important that this premise is properly interpreted. 
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When I say that these agents will not be ‘appropriate’ subjects of retributive blame, I 
mean that they are not appropriate in a normative sense. People may very well attach 
blame to these individuals — a possibility to which I return — but they will be wrong to 
do so. That said, there is a descriptive element to the claim too. I suspect that even if 
people do attach retributive blame to such agents, they will tend to be unsatisfied by the 
results. Furthermore, the claim is intended to be a relatively modest one. I am not 
suggesting that it will never be appropriate to attach blame to a robot or to its 
manufacturers/programmers. In some cases it may be right to do so. I am simply 
claiming that it will be difficult to do so as robots attain more autonomous power.  
 
 Premise (4) can be broken down into two parts. The first part claims that robots 
themselves will not be appropriate targets of retributive blame; the second part claims 
that robot manufacturers and programmers will not be appropriate targets of retributive 
blame. Similar premises have been defended in the literature before (Matthias 2004; 
Sparrow 2007). Here, I adapt these defences to the present argument.  
 
 I start with the robots themselves. Recall that retributive blame requires 
culpability. Culpability is a function of both causal and mental/moral responsibility for 
the outcome. In other words, the outcome must be physically brought about by the 
agent, the agent must have the right kind of mental capacities that open them up to 
blame, and they must have exercised those capacities at the relevant time (Vincent 
2011). The mental capacities for being blamed are traditionally understood in terms of 
various intentional states (i.e. beliefs, desires, intentions). So, for example, the agent 
must know that their actions will (or could) bring about some morally harmful outcome, 
and they must either intend or be reckless or grossly negligent with respect to that 
outcome. Some even argue that conscious representation of the relevant beliefs, desires 
and intentions is necessary for blame (Levy 2014).   
 
 I assume here that robots can be causally responsible for certain outcomes. The 
tricky question is whether they can have and exercise the requisite mental capacities 
(Gunkel 2012; Asaro 2011). There are several reasons to doubt that they can. The first is 
that there are long-standing critiques of the notion that a programmed cognitive 
architecture can replicate or instantiate the kinds of conscious mental state that many 
deem necessary for responsibility (Purves et al 2015). Long-standing objections to the 
notion of ‘Strong AI’ hold that such created artifacts can never have the original 
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intentionality that is required for human-like mental processing. We can speak, 
analogically, of robots desiring certain outcomes but we should doubt whether they 
actually desire outcomes in anything like the way we do, or that they do so in the way 
we deem necessary for retributive blame. The second reason is that we already know 
that existing AI architectures work best when they do not replicate human-like mental 
architectures. Chess-playing computers and facial-recognition programs do not 
approach their tasks by following human-like strategies or methodologies. They work 
by exploring unfathomably large datasets and extrapolating rules and strategies from 
those datasets. In doing so, they can be instrumental reasoners par excellence, but, as 
Bostrom (2012; 2014) points out, there is no reason why their approach to such tasks 
would involve the functional analogues of mental states like beliefs and/or desires and 
intentions. Programs could be constructed so as to follow optimisation processes that 
lack sub-components that line up with what we call beliefs or intentions. And even if 
they could have human-like mental architectures, these may not include moral faculties 
or sensitivity to moral reasons for action. A final for reason for doubt has to do with 
past attempts to ascribe blame to non human-like agents (List and Pettit 2011). The best 
example of this comes from recent attempts to ascribe criminal liability and blame to 
corporations. Such attempts typically boil down to fines or dissolutions, and to 
additional punishments of the individuals who run these corporations. People are 
generally unsatisfied with penalties ascribed solely to the corporate agents. This was 
noticeable in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis when there were extensive public 
calls for individual bankers and CEOs to suffer punishment; not simply for their 
companies to be fined or dissolved.  
 
 The idea that we could ascribe retributive blame to the robots themselves is 
philosophically interesting — and I will return to it below — but given these problems I 
suspect it is far more likely that when a robot misbehaves people will look to the human 
manufacturers and programmers as potential targets for retributive blame. This is 
certainly the dominant assumption in the existing literature, and the approach 
recommended by some (Calo 2015; Hellstrom 2013; Chisan Hew 2014). In the case of 
simple rule-following robots, with a handful of creators, and a limited degree of 
autonomous power, this might be straightforward enough. But with anything more 
sophisticated, two problems will start to emerge: (i) the level of robotic autonomous 
power may be such as to break the link needed for vicarious blame attribution and (ii) 
even if there is some link, the degree of blame is likely to be seriously attenuated, 
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meaning that there is a level of harm that is unmatched by a proportionate or 
corresponding level of retributive blame. Either way, there is a ‘gap’ in the potential 
application of retributive blame. 
 
 As to the first problem, we already see ways in which machine learning can give 
rise to emergent behavioural patterns that are unanticipated and unexpected by the 
original programmers. Such acts of autonomous creativity are likely to increase as 
machine learning programs get better. And the net effect is likely to be compounded as 
robotic cognitive architectures are assembled from pre-existing packages of code and 
grafted onto complex algorithmic ecosystems (Kitchin 2016). The programmers and 
manufacturers will consequently neither intend nor be reckless with respect to the 
potential misbehaviours of their robotic creations: the robots will learn to think and act 
in ways that are beyond the intentions and expectations their original creators. 
Retributive blame for those creators will therefore be blocked. 
 
 This is in turn connects with the attenuation problem. Even if there is some 
residual link between the creators and the robot, it is likely to be attenuated to the point 
where it would not be morally appropriate to ascribe a level retributive blame to those 
creators that covers the full gravity of the moral harm done by the robots. This 
attenuation problem will be further compounded by the fact that sophisticated robots 
with autonomous power are likely to be created by large teams of programmers and 
designers, none of whom have individual control or responsibility for the final robot. At 
best then you have a distribution of an attenuated level of blame across a broad number 
of individuals. 
 
 Someone might respond at this point and claim that the full level of retributive 
blame could be ascribed to the manufacturers and programmers if we simply broaden 
our understanding of what it means to be reckless or grossly negligent with respect to 
robotic behaviours. Perhaps it is reckless or grossly negligent to create any machine, 
with a high degree of autonomous power, that could be causally responsible for moral 
harm? Perhaps we can always ascribe retributive blame to the creators of such robots. 
But this looks like an unwelcome suggestion. First, note that we don’t do this for the 
misuses of other created devices, particularly if the devices have potentially positive 
uses.  Second, it would probably unfair to do so if the behaviours of the robots are truly 
beyond the reasonable expectations of their designers. Fairness and proportionality are 
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key aspects of the retributive philosophy: you give people what they deserve, nothing 
more or less. 
 
 That brings us to premise (5). This one doesn’t need to be defended so much as 
properly explained. The claim is that when you combine a general desire to find 
appropriate targets of retributive blame, with the fact that no such targets can be found, 
you get a retribution gap. This is where the awkward dance between descriptivity and 
normativity reemerges. The gap being mooted is a gap between what is desired and 
what some people believe to be, morally speaking, right. As mentioned earlier, it is the 
mismatch between the normative and descriptive that I find most interesting because it 
is this mismatch that gives rise to the more significant social and legal consequences of 
the retribution gap. But a moral retributivist could dispute premise (5)’s claim about the 
existence of a normatively important gap. Retributivism is the belief that people should 
be punished because they deserve it. Thus, for a retributivist, a retribution gap can only 
arise when there is an appropriate target of retributive blame to whom blame is not 
being ascribed. But what I am claiming in this argument is that in the case of robot-
caused harm, there may be no appropriate targets of blame. But in that case there’s no 
‘gap’ that should concern the moral retributivist. Nobody who deserves punishment is 
going unpunished.  
 
 This view is correct insofar as it accurately states what is normatively relevant 
from the perspective of a retributivist. But that does not mean that there are no 
moral/normative problems arising from the gap between what is desired and what is 
retributively appropriate. As I shall point out in the final section, the gap between what 
is desired and what is appropriate gives rise to a number of normative concerns, 
including concerns about moral scapegoating, that should be of interest to everyone, 
even the most staunch of retributivists. 
 
 With this explanation of premise (5) out of the way, the initial defence of the 
argument is complete. If the argument is right, then the increase in robotisation will lead 
to an increase in the causal responsibility of robots for morally harmful outcomes. Since 
humans are naturally inclined to find someone to retributively punish when morally 
harmful outcomes occur, this will lead to people desiring some appropriate target of 
retributive blame for acts of robot harm. But since, in many cases, neither the robots nor 
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the manufacturers/programmers will be appropriate targets of retributive blame, a ‘gap’ 
will open up. A desire for retribution will go unfulfilled. 
 
 4. Objections and Replies 
 It is worth singling out two further objections and subjecting them to closer 
scrutiny. The first is the Anthropomorphisation Problem and the second is the 
Command Responsibility Objection. Both cast doubt on the likely existence of a 
retribution gap, or suggest easy ways in which it can be plugged. 
 
 The first objection can be illustrated by reference to a particular scene in the 
popular BBC sitcom Fawlty Towers. The series focuses on the eccentricities and 
misfortunes of Basil Fawlty, the owner and manager of a small hotel in Torquay, 
England. In the episode ‘Gourmet Night’, Basil tries to attract the local upper class to 
his hotel by hosting a gourmet dining experience. Unfortunately for him, his head chef 
gets drunk, and he has to source the food for the evening at another restaurant. On the 
drive to the other restaurant, his car breaks down and, clearly at the end of his tether, he 
proceeds to shout at it and to give it a ‘damn good thrashing’ with a fallen-down tree 
branch. In this sense, he appears to blame the car for his misfortune and to mete out 
some punishment to it. The scene illustrates an attitude that humans might take when 
robots misbehave. They might react like Basil Fawlty did to his car. They might 
anthropomorphise the robot — i.e. falsely ascribe relevant human moral faculties to the 
robot — and then feel comfortable punishing it in much the same way that Basil Fawlty 
felt comfortable thrashing his car. In this manner, the alleged retribution gap would 
vanish: the desire for retribution would be satisfied through the process of 
anthropomorphisation. 
 
 There is no doubt that we tend to anthropomorphise technological artifacts and 
that when we do so we start to behave towards them as we would another human being. 
Indeed, this phenomenon has already been researched by those interested in human-
robot interactions. Several studies suggest that humans are willing to ascribe 
responsibility to robots in certain contexts. Some specific findings from these studies 
are particularly interesting. The first, from a study by Kim and Hinds (2006), found that 
humans would ascribe responsibility to a robot delivery machine but that this depended 
on the degree of autonomous power the robot had, i.e. the more power, the more likely 
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the ascription of responsibility. This finding might suggest a further problem for my 
argument insofar as it could be the case that at low levels of autonomous power the 
possibility of vicarious blame-attribution (i.e. blaming of manufacturers) is acceptable; 
while at higher levels the robots themselves become the targets; but at no stage is there 
a ‘gap’ in the human willingness to assign blame. But this has to be tempered by the 
fact that studies also find that willingness to assign blame is dependent on other 
seemingly less relevant factors. For instance, Kim and Hinds (2006) found that blame-
attribution was lessened if the robot was more transparent about what it was doing — 
i.e. if it explained to the humans what it was trying to do. And in another study Hinds et 
al (2004) found that robots were deemed less responsible the less humanoid they were. 
These two factors should, arguably, be irrelevant to blame-attribution: what should 
matter is whether the robot had the requisite capacities and whether it exercised them at 
the relevant time, not whether it looked like a human or whether it told people what it 
was going to do. Other studies have found similar effects (Marin, A et al 2013; Kiesler 
& Goetz 2002) 
 
 There are several reasons to doubt whether the tendency to anthropomorphise can 
cover the alleged retribution gap. If all we care about is whether the desire for 
retribution is fulfilled, then by all means we can take advantage of this tendency to 
anthropomorphise. We can study the quirks and biases of human blame-attribution, and 
design robots that cater to these quirks and biases (e.g. make the robots less transparent, 
but more humanoid). But if we take this approach, we should be aware of potential 
impediments. Not every robot manufacturer will have the incentive to create a 
humanoid robot. The incentive might exist when creating robot carers — because the 
manufacturers want the human users to feel comfortable with the carers6 — but whether 
it exists in other industries is doubtful. There is no real need for a robotic car or military 
drone to take on a human-like form. And yet those kinds of robots might be ones that 
are causally responsible for the most harm. So unless we actively force the 
manufacturers of such devices to make robots that cater to human blame-attribution 
quirks, desires for retribution may remain unfulfilled. But more importantly than this, 
even if we did implement such rules, a true retributivist should remain unhappy. In 
effect, all we are doing is tricking ourselves into believing that we have found 
                                                           
6 Though note the potential impact of the so-called ‘Uncanny Valley’ effect - if the robots are too 
humanoid they may be too creepy for the human users. The uncanny valley was first hypothesised by 
Masahiro Moti in the 1970s and has recently been confirmed in some experimental tests, but how deep 
and wide the valley actually is remains contentious. See: MacDorman & Ishiguro (2006); MacDorman 
(2006); MacDorman, Green, Ho & Koch (2009). 
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appropriate targets of retributive blame. In fact, there is a great danger in going down 
this route. The one incentive that companies might have to create robots that cater to the 
quirks and biases of human blame-attribution processes would be that doing so could 
allow them to avoid being targets of blame attribution. This should be truly worrying if 
the manufacturers could be legitimate targets of blame. 
 
 This brings us to the Command Responsibility Objection. This one claims that the 
alleged retribution gap could be plugged if we simply change our attitude toward the 
manufacture and production of robots with high levels of autonomous power (Hellstrom 
2013). We should view the process as being akin to that which takes place in the 
military. In the military, troops are responsible for implementing and carrying out the 
orders of their commanders. The commanders then take responsibility for any misdeeds 
by their troops in carrying out those deeds. We could look at the creation, manufacture 
and eventual ‘release’ of an autonomous robot in a similar fashion. If such devices are 
created and released by large companies, like Google, then the senior management 
within that company should have command responsibility for what happens when the 
devices are released. They can then be the appropriate targets of retributive blame. The 
gap can be plugged. 
 
 It is important to realise how this objection differs from those previously 
considered whilst defending premise (4) of the main argument. It is not claiming that we 
simply ‘stretch’ or adapt existing standards and tests of blame-attribution. It is arguing 
that we adopt a new standard. In this, it is similar to the suggestion by Calo that we 
make more use of strict liability standards when dealing with potential compensatory 
gaps. The idea is that we set up a new regime of responsibility norms that apply to any 
company or organisation that develops autonomous robots. Anyone who gets into that 
business will know that they have command responsibility for the actions of their 
robots. This has two potential benefits. On the one hand, it should encourage them to be 
more cautious about releasing potentially dangerous robots or to build in safety 
protocols (e.g. kill switches) before doing so; and on the other hand, if the norms of 
responsibility are clearly announced in advance, it makes them more appropriate targets 
of retributive blame should something go wrong. 
 
 This may work to plug the retribution gap, but we should be aware of three 
potential pitfalls. The first is simply that command responsibility doctrines can 
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sometimes fail to comply with intuitions of retributive justice. Indeed, one of the most 
famous cases in the history of the doctrine — the Yamashita (1946) trial — strikes 
many people as failing to do this (Prevost 1992). The case involved a Japanese WWII 
military commander, Tomoyuki Yamashita, being prosecuted and executed for war 
crimes committed by his troops in the Philippines. The verdict was controversial 
because Yamashita was deemed to have command responsibility for his troops despite 
the fact that there was a breakdown in communications and he was (allegedly) unaware 
of what happened. This has led to more relaxed doctrines being pronounced in 
subsequent years. There is a danger of something similar happening to robot 
manufacturers if a similarly strict standard of responsibility is applied to them: they may 
be legally punished but this may fail to align with what is retributively appropriate. Or, 
if a more relaxed doctrine is applied, there may once again fail to be a target of 
retributive blame. A second problem with this approach is that it may have a stultifying 
effect on the growth and development of robotics. It is important to bear in mind that 
developments in robotics can be socially beneficial. A self-driving car with a lower risk 
of accidents could reduce the number of deaths on our roads. But if we impose too high 
a standard of responsibility on the manufacturers of such devices, we may slow (or 
completely block) their development. We need to consider whether the existence of a 
retribution gap is sufficiently serious to warrant that risk of stultification. Finally, it is 
worth bearing in mind that information technology now enables people to develop 
robotics or AI projects with a limited organisational infrastructure. Robots may not be 
developed by the large, well-integrated commercial enterprises of the 20th century; they 
may be developed by culturally and geographically distributed networks, with no clear 
hierarchy or visible infrastructure (Scherer 2016). Whereas it is relatively easy to 
impose something like a command responsibility framework onto a well-integrated, 
large organisation; it is much more difficult to do so with fragmented and distributed 
organisations. 
 
 5. Why the Retribution Gap Matters 
 Suppose then that there is a retribution gap. Who cares? Does the fact that people 
look for appropriate targets of retributive blame, but none can be found, have any 
important social or legal repercussions? I close by highlighting three potentially 
important implications. The strength and significance of these implications varies 
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depending on your preferred theory of punishment or your overarching theory of social 
justice/morality.  
 
 The first implication is that the existence of a retribution gap can give rise to an 
increased risk of moral scapegoating. If there is a deep human desire to find appropriate 
targets of retributive blame, but none really exist, then there is a danger that people will 
try to fulfill that desire in inappropriate ways. Or, perhaps even more serious than this, 
that other social actors will take advantage of the desire in inappropriate ways. I have 
hinted at this risk several times in this article. I have noted how robot manufacturers 
could toy with the quirks and biases of human blame-attribution in order to misapply 
blame to the robots themselves, and I have noted how doctrines of command 
responsibility or gross negligence could be unfairly stretched so as to inappropriately 
blame the manufacturers and programmers. Anyone who cares about the strict 
requirements of retributive justice, or indeed justice more generally, should be 
concerned about the risk of moral scapegoating. 
 
 The second implication is that the existence of a retribution gap could pose a 
threat to the rule of law. According to some legal theorists (Robinson 2013; Robinson 
& Kurzban 2007; Robinson, Kurzban and Jones 2007) the majority of people have a 
reasonably fixed set of intuitions about what kinds of behaviours or outcomes are 
morally harmful and about how people should be punished for engaging in or causing 
these outcomes (in this they include preference for retribution). They argue that the rule 
of law can be undermined if legal systems fail to align with these intuitive judgments. If 
the legal system seems to be out of touch with what ordinary folk think is right, these 
ordinary folk will lose trust in the legal system and may resort to vigilantism in an effort 
to seek justice. The existence of a retribution gap could exacerbate this phenomenon. If 
people feel that someone deserves retributive blame for the harmful acts of robots, but 
our legal and moral systems are incapable of finding anyone, you will have a situation 
in which intuitive judgments are out of line with legal practice. This could begin to 
erode respect for the rule of law. Moral retributivists could respond here by saying that 
ordinary folk simply need to recalibrate their intuitive judgments and understand why 
no appropriate subject of retributive blame can be found. That is all well and good, but 
this still requires that we get to grips with this potential threat. 
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 The third implication follows on from the second. The view defended by 
Robinson and Kurzban has been labelled ‘Punishment Naturalism’ by its critics 
(Brahman, Kahan and Hoffman 2010). To them, Robinson and Kurzban’s view assumes 
too readily that judgments of wrongdoing are fixed by a common and innate set of 
intuitions. Although there may be some consistency in such judgments in particular 
communities or states, this consistency is not natural or fixed. On the contrary, it is 
culturally contingent and open to being changed. Instead of Punishment Naturalism, 
these critics adopt a theory they call Punishment Realism, which openly acknowledges 
and respects the contingency and fluidity of our intuitions about wrongdoing and 
punishment. This is significant in the present context because one thing this criticism 
helps to highlight is how the existence of a retribution gap presents a strategic opening 
for those who oppose retributivism. An increased amount of robot-caused harm, in the 
absence of retributive blame, could shock or unsettle the cultural status quo. Since that 
status quo seems to be dominated by retributivism (in many countries), something needs 
to be inserted into the gap in order to restore the equilibrium. Those who prefer and 
advocate for non-retributive approaches to crime and punishment could find themselves 
faced with a great opportunity. Their calls for a more consequentialist, harm-
reductionist approach to our practices of punishment and blame could have a better 
hearing in light of the retribution gap. Consequently, there is something of significance 
in the retribution gap for those who completely reject the retributivist philosophy. 
 
 
 6. Conclusion 
 In this article I have made three arguments. First, I have argued that debates 
about robotisation in the law need to look beyond its potential impact on doctrines of 
(civil) liability. In particular, they need to look beyond what I call ‘compensation gaps’ 
and how to plug them. Although these gaps are undoubtedly interesting and significant, 
they are relatively easy to plug. Second, I have argued that increasing robotisation could 
give rise to a far more interesting gap when looked at from the perspective of criminal 
liability. In particular, I have argued that more and more robots, engaging in more and 
more potentially harmful activities, could give rise to a ‘retribution gap’. When people 
are harmed by the activities of a robot, they will look for potential targets of retributive 
blame but it is possible that none will be found. I suggested that this gap arises from 
certain innate drives toward retributive punishment, and a mismatch between these 
innate drives and what is deemed normatively appropriate. Third, and finally, I have 
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argued that this retributive gap has three potentially significant social implications: (i) it 
could lead to an increased risk of moral scapegoating; (ii) it could erode confidence in 
the rule of law; and (iii) it could present a strategic opening for those who favour non-
retributive approaches to crime and punishment.  
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